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THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION 
BUREAU: 
A FIVE-YEAR RETROSPECTIVE1 
ROBERT E. KRAINER 
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON 
INTRODUCTION 
July 21, 2015 marked the fifth anniversary of the passing into law of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-
Frank”).2 Dodd-Frank is a roughly 2,300 page document and its 
complicated rules and regulations are still in the process of being 
formulated and implemented. In this paper I will primarily concern myself 
with Title X of the Act, namely, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(“CFPB”)3 focusing attention on certain aspects of the home mortgage 
market. More generally, we want to know whether Dodd-Frank and the 
CFPB have furthered the goals of government policy. In a broad sense the 
answer must be: no. The answer is no because there is a stark contradiction 
between the goals of the CFPB and the other parts of Dodd-Frank. 
Superimposed on both is a social policy going back to the 1930’s whose 
goal is to promote home ownership and access to financial products for all 
income groups including low-income households. The goal of the CFPB is 
to protect consumers while the rest of Dodd-Frank is designed to stabilize 
the financial system. As we will see below, both are in conflict with each 
other and the social goal of subsidizing housing and access to financial 
products for low-income families. What makes this a particularly dangerous 
contradiction is that all three goals are designed to be attained within the 
private financial sector. We question the wisdom of running welfare 
programs through the private financial system, the system that broke down 
in 2007-2008. In Section IV, we sketch out a program on how the 
 
 1.  A paper presented at the 2015 fall symposium on Law and Public Policy at the School of 
Law at Saint Thomas University and forthcoming in the Journal of Law and Public Policy. 
 2.  Victor McGrane and Andrew Ackerman, Five Years Later, Dodd Frank Creators Say 
the American Banking System is Better Off, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2015. 
 3.  Legal Information Institute, Cornell University Law School, Dodd-Frank: Title X-
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/dodd-frank_title_X. 
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government might possibly sidestep this contradiction. 
In evaluating the CFPB we begin in Section II by briefly describing the 
economic events that gave rise to Dodd-Frank. That economic background 
was the Great Financial and Economic Crisis that began in 2007. This crisis 
was different. It was more severe than any recession since the Great 
Depression. It also illustrated some of the most egregious practices that 
characterizes the financial system in a competitive capitalist system. In 
Section III, we describe the salient features of the regulatory response to the 
Great Crisis, focusing mainly on the CFPB regulation of home mortgages. 
We then present a five-year evaluation of the CFPB in Section IV. Section 
V concludes with a brief summary and a suggestion for a different approach 
to achieving financial stability along with a government program 
encouraging home ownership for all income classes. 
 
THE GREAT CRISIS 
I. THE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 
The financial and subsequent economic crisis that started in 2007 was 
the worst experienced by the United States since the Great Depression in 
the 1930’s. Figure 1 compares the 2007–2009 recession to the previous five 
recessions.4 There it can be seen that the 2007–2009 recession was both 
deeper and of a longer duration than any of the five previous recessions. 
According to Treasury Department estimates, 8.8 million jobs were lost as 
of 2012.5 The unemployment rate reached 10 percent in 2009, and the 
civilian labor force participation rate fell from 64.4 percent in 2000 to 58.4 
percent in 2011. People gave up looking for jobs. The cumulative cost from 
Figure 2 in terms of lost real Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”) ranged from 
$6 trillion to $14 trillion (so far) or $50,000 to $120,000 per household, 
depending on assumptions regarding the long-run trend in real GDP after 
the crisis.6 Over the 2007–2011 period household net worth in housing 
assets fell 33 percent, and stock market valuations fell 40 percent between 
October 2007 and June 2009. According to U.S. Department of Treasury 
estimates, total household wealth fell $19.2 trillion over this period.7 
Finally, the Great Crisis was not limited to the United States. As Figure 3 
 
 4.  See The Dep’t of the Treasury, The Financial Crisis Response in Charts (April 2012), 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-
center/Documents/20120413_FinancialCrisisResponse.pdf (accessed Feb. 10, 2016). 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  See Tyler Atkinson et al., How Bad was It? The Costs and Consequences of the 2007-09 
Financial Crisis, FED. RES. BANK DALLAS, no. 20, July 2013. 
 7.  In a September 19-20, 2015 WSJ  article (p.A3) it was indicated that valuations of stocks 
and mutual funds have greatly surpassed pre-crisis levels, while non-financial assets (primarily 
real estate) have barely reached their pre-crisis level. Josh Zumbrun, Household Wealth Climbs to 
Fresh High, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10-20, 2015, at A3. 
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indicates, world output declined, and as of 2012 had not returned to its 
previous trend level. 
Figure 1: This Recession Was the Worst since the Great Depression 
 
 
Figure 2: Output Loss Is Sensitive to Different Assumptions about Trend 
 
Figure 3: Financial Crisis Impact Not Limited to Domestic Output 
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What were the causes of this calamitous event? It is generally agreed 
that overinvestment, especially in housing assets, was the principal 
initiating cause of the Great Crisis. Several factors came together to cause 
the overinvestment in housing. One was the government’s social policy of 
encouraging home ownership. A second was the absence of regulation of 
banks and shadow banks, partly the result of the deregulation of the 
financial system completed in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of November 
of 1999. With regard to social policy, Agarwal et al. offer evidence that the 
Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 pushed banks in the direction of 
providing riskier mortgage financing for low-income and minority groups, 
especially in and around regulatory conformance exam dates.8 The Housing 
and Community Development Act of 1992 and subsequent political 
pressure from the Clinton Administration required the mortgage purchasers, 
Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac, to invest a substantial proportion of their 
portfolio in affordable housing mortgages. Both of these acts of Congress 
facilitated an expansion in housing demand (especially by those income 
groups least able to service their mortgage debt) and contributed to the 
increased but unsustainable price appreciation of real estate assets in the 
run-up to the crisis. 
Innovations in financial contracting also contributed to the expansion in 
demand for housing assets. Securitization enabled banks to make loans to 
home buyers and then off-load them to a securitizing trust that in turn sold 
claims against the trust in the capital market. The individual mortgages 
became constituent parts of a portfolio within the trust whose tranches trade 
in the capital market. The advantage of securitization is reduced risk of the 
portfolio due to diversification. The disadvantage is the absence of 
 
 8.  Sumit Agarwal et al., Inconsistent Regulators: Evidence from Banking, Q. J. ECON. 129, 
889-938 (2014). 
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subsequent monitoring of each individual mortgage within the portfolio, 
and a moral hazard problem. The moral hazard problem is that banks have 
less incentive to evaluate the creditworthiness of their individual mortgage 
customers when they lend only to subsequently distribute. In addition, the 
investment quality of the various tranches proved difficult to evaluate by 
the credit rating agencies. Since credit ratings are paid by the issuer of the 
securities being rated, there was a natural bias for the rating agencies to 
overrate the various tranches. Other innovations include low down 
payments, various forms of back loading the mortgage contract, and 
adjustable rate mortgages, such as the 2/28 mortgage. The 2/28 mortgage 
offered the borrower a low fixed-rate for two years and then floated with 
some short-term rate, like the London Interbank Offer Rate (“LIBOR”), 
plus a risk premium. These somewhat exotic contract forms, along with the 
encouragement of government policy, enabled many individuals who were 
unable to obtain a standard qualified mortgage to obtain the financing 
necessary to buy a home. US social policy during this period seemed to 
tolerate wide dispersion in the distribution of after-tax income, but less 
dispersion in access to housing assets and other financial products. 
Perhaps even more important than government policy towards housing 
was the erratic pattern of monetary policy from 2002 through 2007. The 
growth rate of M1 went from an annual average of 5.2 percent during the 
run-up of housing asset prices in 2002–2005, to a -.23 percent from 2005–
2007 during which housing investments and valuations tapered off and 
began to fall.9 In the run-up period, monetary policy increased bank 
reserves enabling banks to increase their investments in mortgages; while at 
the same time falling interest rates were inducing households to increase 
their demand for investments in housing assets. Another contributing factor 
increasing the supply of bank loans to the housing sector was the increase in 
bank share valuations reflecting a decline in the risk aversion of bank 
shareholders. Over the period 2002–2007 bank share valuations rose seven 
percent annually on average; thus reducing the equity cost of capital to 
banks. Finally, the global savings glut resulting from years of United States 
balance of payments deficits, first with Japan and then China, also supplied 
the finance for the strong demand for housing assets. 
However, what goes up eventually comes down. The down period 
began with the tightening of monetary policy and its effects on interest 
rates. Housing demand began to fall in 2006/2007. With the fall in demand, 
the valuations of housing assets began to fall. The falling valuations of 
housing assets, along with the innovative contract forms that pushed 
payments into the future, resulted in negative equity for a growing number 
of home investors. Since most mortgages are non-recourse loans, many 
 
 9.  All data on the M1 measure of the money supply obtained from the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System in Money Stock Measures-H-6. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE 
FED. RESERVE SYS., MONEY STOCK MEASURES – H.6 (2002 – 2007). 
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households with negative equity were forced to default on their mortgages 
and surrendered their home to the bank.10 Banks typically sold the home as 
fast as possible thereby exacerbating the decline in the valuations of 
housing assets and creating a downward valuation spiral in the housing 
market. The losses being realized in the banking system soon spread to the 
interconnected and highly levered shadow banks, who had difficulty 
funding the various tranches of securitized mortgage pools they held in their 
portfolio. Some (e.g., Lehman Bros.) went bankrupt, others (e.g., Bear 
Stearns and Merrill Lynch) were merged into stronger banks, and still 
others (e.g., Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley) became banks in order to 
access Federal Reserve funding. For all practical purposes, the large 
traditional investment banks disappeared.  Money market mutual funds that 
provided commercial paper and repo financing to these large investment 
banks, stopped funding them when Reserve Primary Fund (the oldest 
money market mutual fund in the United States) “broke the buck” as a 
result of large investments in the short-term liabilities of Lehman and fled 
to safety by investing in short-term treasury securities. The integrated 
financial system was breaking down and unable to fulfill its financial 
intermediation function. In response to this breakdown, the US Treasury 
Department guaranteed the shares of money market mutual funds from 
September 2008 to September 2009; much like the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation’s (“FDIC”) guarantee of bank deposits.11 
Furthermore, the Federal Reserve temporarily from provided commercial 
paper funding to American and foreign firms October 2008 to February 
2009.12 
The decline in the valuation of housing assets spread to the stock 
market and other sectors of the economy. The stock market rose sharply 
from August 2002 to October 2007 (as investor risk aversion fell), and then 
fell precipitously (as risk aversion rose) possibly as a result of the housing 
crisis reaching a low in February 2009. Declining valuations in housing and 
stock market assets had real effects on consumption and real-investment 
spending. When housing and stock market valuations increase, households 
 
 10.  Much has been made of optimal strategic default decision in the literature. However, 
Gerardi et al., using new data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, find that the vast 
majority of defaults were not the result of a calculated strategic default decision but of the simple 
fact that the defaulter (and/or spouse) lost a job, got divorced, experience unexpected medical 
expenses, and other unexpected negative shocks to income and wealth. For the most part, 
defaulters didn’t have the resources to service the mortgage. Moreover, even for those households 
who are unable to pay, many find a way to continue to pay. People will do everything possible to 
stay in their own home. Gerardi, Kyle F. Herkenhoff, Lee E. Ohanian & Paul Willen, Can’t Pay 
or Won’t Pay? Unemployment, Negative Equity, and Strategic Default (NBER, Working Paper 
No. w21630, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2672744. 
 11.  The Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces Temporary Guarantee Program for 
Money Market Funds, Press Center (Sept. 29, 2008), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/hp1161.aspx. 
 12.  Federal Reserve History, The Federal Reserve, Federal Reserve Credit Programs During 
the Meltdown (Oct. 2008), http://www.federalreservehistory.org/Events/DetailView/70. 
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consider those increases as a form of savings. When these valuations 
decrease, households respond by decreasing consumption to build up 
savings and to reduce their debt outstanding. In this connection, Angrisani 
et al. found that for every dollar decline in the valuations of housing assets, 
consumption fell by seven cents.13 They also found that a dollar decline in 
stock market wealth was associated with a four-cent decline in 
consumption. With consumption falling, firms cut back on investment, 
production, and employment; thereby producing the most severe recession 
the country experienced since the Great Depression. 
II. THE REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GREAT CRISIS 
Whenever an economy experiences a finance initiated recession of the 
magnitude experienced by the United States and the developed economies 
of the world, a regulatory response is not far behind. This is especially true 
when those in the financial sector, who many blamed for the crisis, received 
and continued to receive high and well-publicized executive pay packages. 
One regulatory response for the developed countries of the world took the 
form of the Third Basel Accord (“Basel III”). Basel III raised the minimum 
capital and liquidity requirements for internationally active banks.14 The 
idea was that if banks and so-called shadow banks had more equity capital 
to absorb losses stemming from the real estate sector and more liquidity to 
ward off runs on deposits and repurchase agreements, the financial and 
economic crisis of 2007–2009 might have been avoided or at least blunted 
to a considerable extent. 
Basel III was an international regulatory response to the crisis. The 
regulatory response in the United States took the form of Dodd-Frank 
passed by Congress and signed into law on July 21, 2010. Dodd-Frank 
represented a comprehensive re-regulation of the U.S. financial system.15 In 
this paper, we will focus on Title X or the consumer protection part of the 
Act. 
Typically, financial induced economic crises reveal a number of sharp, 
if not outright, fraudulent practices. The recession of 2008-2009 was no 
exception. Many of the sharp, if not fraudulent, practices during this period 
centered on the complex contract forms of home mortgages, credit card 
borrowing, and payday loans. While the questionable practices in contract 
form were not a major cause of the recession, they served as a flashpoint for 
the human suffering that accompanied the recession. Therefore, a regulatory 
response was inevitable. 
 
 13.  Marco Angrisani et al., The Effect of Housing and Stock Wealth Losses on Spending in 
the Great Recession (Rand Labor & Population, Working Paper No. 1101, 2015). 
 14.  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Bank for International Settlements (Mar. 
2015), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d312.pdf. 
 15.  For a description of the Dodd-Frank Act see Krainer, R. 2012. Regulating Wall Street: 
The Dodd-Frank Act and the New Architecture of Global Finance, a Review, J. FIN. STABILITY 
121-133 (2012) (discussing the Dodd-Frank Act). 
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Dodd-Frank created the CFPB. The Bureau took over many (but not all) 
of the regulatory duties that previously were carried out by other 
government agencies in the area of financial regulation.16 The CFPB is set 
up and financed within (but completely independent of) the Federal 
Reserve. The Director of the Bureau is appointed by the President subject to 
the confirmation of the Senate; although, the first Director was appointed 
during a congressional recess and was not confirmed by the Senate until 
two years after his appointment.17 The CFPB enjoys a level of financial 
independence from Congress that is rare for a government agency. Its 
annual budget is paid by the Federal Reserve and is very generous. Its 
budget cannot exceed an amount greater than 12 percent of the budget of 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.18 
The main purpose of the CFPB is to administer, implement, and enforce 
consumer protection laws. It does this by conducting educational programs, 
responding to consumer complaints, and conducting research so as to 
identify risks to a consumer from financial products.19 The general idea is to 
prohibit unfair, deceptive, and abusive practices in the sale of financial 
products. The CFPB was purposely given a broad mandate by Congress that 
is somewhat vague, in order that, with time, it could identify unfair, 
deceptive, and abusive practices and formulate specific rules against these 
practices. Some of these rules include: 
 
i. Regulate private student loans and the servicing of loans. 
ii. Regulate certain fees in connection with credit card and debit card 
transactions. 
iii. Set standards for Qualified Mortgages. 
iv.Regulate certain aspects of payday loans. 
v. Regulate electronic fund transfers. 
vi. Regulate prepaid cards.20 
In regulating these various types of consumer financial products the 
Bureau has accumulated a wide range of regulatory authority over financial 
institutions. For example, they have the power to issue subpoenas, conduct 
 
 16.  Legal Information Institute, supra note 3. 
 17.  Robert E. Krainer, Regulating Wall Street: The Dodd-Frank Act and the New 
Architecture of Global Finance, a Review, 8 J. OF FIN. STABILITY 121, 121-133 (2012) 
 18.  Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (“CFPB”), The CFPB Strategic Plan, Budget, and 
Performance Plan and Report (Feb. 2016),  
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201602_cfpb_report_strategic-plan-budget-and-performance-
plan_FY2016.pdf. 
 19.  CFPB, About Us, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/. 
 20.  CFPB, Overview of the CFPB,  
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/strategic-plan/. 
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hearings, issue cease-and-desist orders, request data, and levy fines on 
financial institutions selling financial products to households. Their 
mandate from Congress seems more open-ended than the mandates for 
other regulatory authorities. 
III. AN EVALUATION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION 
A. A New Philosophy of Regulation 
The Great Crisis has given rise to a new economic philosophy towards 
consumer protection and regulation. Previously the underlying philosophy 
was based on Neo-Classical economic theory. According to this theory the 
job of the regulatory authority was to eliminate fraud and to make sure that 
consumers had full information on products available for sale in the market 
place including financial products. Households were assumed to be rational 
decision-makers, but needed help in overcoming the problem of asymmetric 
information between the seller and buyer of a financial product. Regulation 
provided that help. The philosophy of regulation in the post Great Crisis 
took the form of the CFPB, and is partly based on what has come to be 
called Behavioral Economics.21  Behavioral economics and finance have 
uncovered a number of empirical anomalies in the behavior of investors and 
managers of firms that have been interpreted by some economists and legal 
scholars as a rejection of the full informational efficiency of financial 
markets. In addition to requiring vendors to provide full information about a 
product, behavioral economics and law takes the view that some consumers 
have to be protected from their inability to make rational decisions even 
when they have easy access to full information. 
Nowhere is this more evident than in the area of contract form in the 
housing market and various markets for consumer credit. These contracts 
are often quite lengthy, complex, and written at a level of English that 
exceeds the level for the average person. It has been argued that these 
complex contract forms contributed to the large number of mortgage 
defaults and forfeiture of homes during the Great Crisis.22 Perhaps the most 
noteworthy features in these non-traditional home mortgage contracts were 
adjustable rate mortgages and the so-called “back loading” of mortgages. 
Adjustable rate mortgages start off with low interest rates, and with time the 
interest rate would adjust upward.  Back loading, or negative amortization, 
mortgages occur when interest and principal payments get pushed from the 
present into the future. Both adjustable rates and the back-loading of 
mortgages made future interest payments much higher, and the pay down of 
 
 21.  For a more detailed account of the role of Behavioral economics and law in the Dodd-
Frank Act see: Jason Scott Jonson, Do Product Bans Help Consumers? Questioning the Economic 
Foundations of Dodd-Frank Mortgage Regulation (U. of Virginia Sch. of Law, Pub. Law and 
Legal Theory Research Paper Series 2015-22) 
 22.  Robert E. Krainer, Economic Stability Under Alternative Banking Systems (Sept. 14, 
2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2147888. 
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principal much lower which, when combined with falling house prices, 
contributed to the large number of defaults that occurred during the crisis. 
Since some home buyers were surprised by the payment pattern of these 
non-standard mortgages, one policy suggestion would be to require 
mortgage issuers to provide printouts of future payments schedules for the 
life of the mortgage contract under several assumptions regarding 
movements in future interest rates. This would enable households to 
observe the future pattern of mortgage payments upfront, thereby, shifting 
the surprise from the future to the present when a decision is in the process 
of being made. 
How did the CFPB react to this problem? The CFPB has chosen not to 
ban these complicated mortgage contract forms. What they have done is to 
define what constitutes a qualified mortgage. These standards include the 
following: 
 
i. Points and fees cannot exceed three percent of the amount borrowed. 
ii. No interest only or negative amortization loans. Similarly, no balloon 
loans with certain exceptions for rural and farming areas. 
iii. Debt to income ratio cannot exceed 45 percent. 
iv. Lender must make a good faith determination of the borrower’s ability 
to repay the loan. This standard also applies to payday loans and credit 
card debt. 
v. Restrictions on pre-payment fees which can only be used on 30 year 
fixed rate mortgages. 
vi. Prohibition on steering fees to brokers for the sale of certain high-
priced and complicated contract forms. 
vii. Prohibits predatory debt collection and debt servicing. 
All mortgages not meeting the standard of a qualified mortgage are then 
classified as a non-qualified mortgage. The distinction between a qualified 
versus a non-qualified mortgage is potentially important. A qualified 
mortgage is granted a “safe harbor” for the issuing bank protecting them 
from future liability under the “truth-in-lending” laws. Such protection 
would not necessarily be accorded to issuers of non-qualified mortgages. In 
this way the CFPB “nudges” mortgage underwriters to supply more 
qualified mortgages and fewer non-qualified mortgages. 
The regulatory reach of the CFPB goes beyond mortgage contracts. For 
example, credit card companies are now required to assess the ability of 
borrowers to repay credit card debt incurred. The CFPB also regulates 
certain fees, although, the Federal Reserve still retains the regulation of 
interchange fees of credit card companies. Credit card companies cannot 
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retroactively increase interest rate except when the cardholder is delinquent 
on payments for more than 60 days. For cardholders in general, the card 
company cannot raise rates on borrowing or implement new fees (e.g., 
foreign exchange fees) without first informing the cardholders. Finally, 
credit card companies cannot restrict retailer discounts to customers for 
cash payments. 
Another financial institution that came under heavy criticism after the 
Crisis were payday lenders. Alarming stories of individuals paying up to 
400% interest in a debt spiral of re-borrowing just to pay interest, although 
probably rare, were enough to spur a regulatory response.23 Some called for 
a complete ban on payday lending. Advocates for the industry claim that 
payday lending fills a gap in the financial system that enables low income 
groups access to credit to meet unexpected emergencies. On the other hand, 
Cuffe and Gibbs find that the State of Washington’s restrictions on payday 
lending were associated with a reduction in the sales of liquor at state liquor 
outlets.24 Moreover, the reduction in sales of liquor were greatest the closer 
the payday lender was to the liquor store. 
What restrictions on payday lending are in place? Payday loans in the 
amount of $2000 or less, with a maturity of 91 days or less, with interest 
rates in excess of 36 percent, are banned by the military under the 2007 
Military Authorization Act.25 Previous to this Act, military personnel were 
relatively heavy users of payday loans. Payday loans are also subject to 
CFPB regulations. On March 26, 2015 the CFPB proposed that payday 
lenders must do an analysis on whether the borrower can pay back the loan. 
They also imposed limitations on collection practices, loan rollovers, allow 
no mandatory waiver of consumer protection laws, allow no prepayment 
fees, and other regulations. 
B. Some Costs of Regulation 
The above described regulations are designed to have an effect. The 
designed effect is to dampen the supply of financial products that will 
potentially jeopardize the financial health of individuals and the health of 
the entire financial system, through the inter-connectedness of financial 
institutions. This is the behavioral aspect of the new regulation. However, 
many economists and legal scholars remind us that financial regulations 
that ban or raise the price of some financial products will necessarily 
preclude some individuals from obtaining the financial products that ex-post 
would maximize their utility. The problem is that it is impossible to know 
 
 23.  CFPB, What is a Payday Loan?, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/1567/what-
payday-loan.html. 
 24.  Harold E. Cuffe & Christopher G. Gibbs, The Effect of Payday Lending Restrictions on 
Liquor Sales (Victoria Univ. of Wellington Sch. of Econ. and Fin., Working Paper No. 11/2015) 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2652018. 
 25.  Scott Carrell & Jonathon Zinman, In Harm’s Way? Payday Loan Access and Military 
Personnel Performance, Review of Financial Studies 27, 2805-2840 (2014). 
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ex-ante which individuals (and at what time in the financial and economic 
cycle) will (or will not) jeopardize their own financial health and the health 
of the financial system. Complicated contract forms were helpful to some 
households in certain time periods and under certain circumstances. In this 
connection, back-loaded mortgages can make a great deal of economic 
sense for some individuals when certain conditions hold. For example, 
some households may experience income growth (or a bequest) in the 
future enabling them to afford high debt service charges in the future 
compared to the present. Other households might be able to service present 
mortgage payments, but a short-term emergency (e.g., medical expense or 
college expenses) might arise making it convenient to push debt service into 
the future. Critics of the CFPB point to other costs of the regulatory 
response to the Great Crisis. According to Zywicki the number of unbanked 
households increased after the passage of Dodd-Frank.26 In a 2013 FDIC 
survey, 9.6 million US households (7.7 percent of all households) did not 
have a bank account.27 In the same survey, the FDIC found that 20 percent 
of all US households were underbanked, in that they did not have access to 
certain financial products offered by banks. Free checking has disappeared 
for a number of individuals and monthly maintenance fees have doubled. 
One reason was that banks were forced by Dodd-Frank to get out of certain 
lucrative, but risky, lines of business. To recapture the lost revenues, banks 
raised the fees (when they could) on a number of financial products they 
sold to households. Finally, CFPB data for the end of 2012 indicate credit 
card use and lines have declined by $200 billion since February 2010 when 
the Credit Card Accountability and Disclosure Act took effect. The higher 
price of financial services have had a disproportionate effect on low income 
households. Finally, the record keeping necessary to comply with CFPB 
regulations has been burdensome to banks in general, and small banks in 
particular. And yet, Mian and Sufi provide strong empirical evidence that 
households with Vantage Score scores below 700 had the largest growth in 
debt in the run-up period between 2000–2007 and the largest default rate in 
2007–2008.28 That triggered the Crisis that, so far, has resulted in lost GDP 
somewhere between $6 trillion and $14 trillion, not to mention the ill-health 
side-effects and criminal activity that accompanies recessions of this 
magnitude.29 The question is whether the costs (which fall on the rich and 
 
 26.  Todd Zywicki, The Dodd-Frank Act Five Years Later: Are We More Stable?, GEO. 
MASON UNIV. LAW & ECON. RES. PAPER SERIES, 15–28 (2015). 
 27.  See 2013 FDIC Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households, Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (last updated Oct. 28, 2014),  
https://fdic.gov/householdsurvey /2013report.pdf. 
 28.  Mian, A and Sufi. Household Debt and Defaults from 2000-2010: Facts from Credit 
Bureau Data. (Chicago Booth, Working Paper No. 129, 2015). 
 29.  Vantage scores vary between 550 and 990 whereas FICO scores vary between 300 and 
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poor) resulting from added financial regulation will materially reduce the 
likelihood of future crises. 
C. Conflicting Goals in U.S. Government Policy: Financial Stability vs 
Accessible Credit for All 
Is it possible for the CFPB to achieve the goals of government policy 
towards consumers in the mortgage and other financial product markets? If 
the only goal of government policy is to protect consumers, the answer is 
probably yes. In a broader sense, the answer is decidedly no. The answer is 
no because government is simultaneously pursuing three policies that at 
times are working at cross purposes to each other. One policy beginning in 
the early 1980s had the effect of changing the distribution of income to 
become more skewed towards the rich.30 This policy was primarily 
implemented by reducing the progressivity of the US personal income tax. 
Since the rich have a high propensity to save (an MPS=.5 according to 
Dynan et al., it is necessary that medium and low income groups have 
access to credit in order to spend for goods and services in order to maintain 
aggregate demand and relatively full employment.31 Evidence that the 
consumption share of the bottom 95 percent did not fall as much as their 
share in income is provided by Krueger and Perri.32 The social policy was 
designed to encourage home ownership for all income classes in order to 
foster domestic tranquility. This policy takes a number of different forms. 
One form is the tax deductibility of interest on borrowings to finance home 
ownership. This form benefits all income classes. A second form is 
implemented by the Federal Home Loan Banks originally created by 
Congress in 1932. The Federal Home Loan Banks lend to local financial 
institutions that, in turn, finance local home ownership and local economic 
development projects. This policy has mainly benefited medium and low 
income families. A third form, since 1934, is the subsidized government 
insurance of mortgages provided by the Federal Housing Administration 
(FHA) which enables lenders to offer low down payments and closing costs 
making it easier for borrowers to qualify for mortgage credit. This policy 
has also mainly benefited medium and low income groups. A fourth form 
this housing policy takes is designed to provide liquidity to the secondary 
mortgage market. This policy benefits all income classes. To achieve this 
goal Congress set up two government sponsored agencies (GSE’s); Fannie 
Mae (“Fannie”) in 1938 and Freddy Mac (“Freddy”) in 1970. Fannie and 
Freddy provide liquidity to the secondary mortgage market in that they 
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purchase home mortgages from private financial institutions. The fifth 
policy was the enactment of the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977.33 
To help low and middle income groups, the Act requires supervisory 
agencies such as the Federal Reserve, the Comptroller of the Currency, and 
the Office of Thrift Supervision to encourage the financial institutions they 
regulate to reinvest in the communities in which they are located. The 
primary goal of Congress in establishing these government-sponsored 
enterprises is to provide low cost subsidized financing for home purchases 
made by medium and low income groups. 
In juxtaposition to these two policies of allowing a more skewed 
distribution of income favoring the rich and at the same time facilitating 
access to credit by medium and low income groups to maintain aggregate 
demand and employment, Congress has pursued policies designed to 
provide stability to the private financial system. This started with the Glass 
Steagall Act of 1933 in response to the Great Depression, and ended with 
Dodd-Frank in response to the Great Recession.34 The vigorous pursuit of 
the policies that promote access to credit and home ownership for all will 
eventually compromise the policies directed towards attaining financial and 
economic stability which then will eventually result in a financial and 
economic crisis which then will result in government pursuing policies 
designed to achieve financial and economic stability which then 
compromises the policies designed to promote home ownership and access 
to credit for all. This back and forth on the pursuits of these two 
incompatible policies serves no useful purpose for society and contributes 
to the volatility of economic activity. 
Can the goals of these policies be made compatible? Probably not.35 
Kumhof et al. — in the context of a Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium (“DSGE”) model where income inequality and personal 
leverage are explicitly modeled—suggests that a reversal of the growing 
inequality of income would reduce the financial leverage of medium and 
low income families and reduce the probability of a future financial and 
economic crisis.36 Barring a reversal of the growing inequality of income, 
we suggest a way to, perhaps, side-step this incompatibility across different 
government policies. That suggestion would take the financing of the policy 
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of credit access and housing for medium and low income families out of the 
private banking and shadow banking sectors and put it into a newly created 
government sponsored enterprise (“GSE”). Access to this GSE would only 
be available to individuals below some predetermined income level. Low 
income households would apply directly to this government financial 
institution for a home loan, and if made, the loan would remain on the 
books of this government institution. This would make it different than the 
FHA, Fannie Mae, and Freddy Mac in that the GSE would directly lend to 
low income households and hold the loan to maturity or default. 
Consequently, the risky subprime mortgage loans of low income families 
would not be on the balance sheet of a private financial intermediary and 
potentially weaken the private financial system.37 An example of this type 
of financial institution is the Federal Farm Credit System that provides 
subsidized financing for farms and other agricultural enterprises. We further 
recommend that the financing of this government enterprise be a line item 
in the government budget so that the executive and legislative branches 
would be required to prioritize it relative to competing uses of government 
funding. In this way, the social goal of subsidizing home ownership for all 
would become a part of fiscal policy, just like other welfare programs of the 
government. Running the social program of credit access and housing for 
low income groups through the private financial sector risks bankrupting 
the banking and financial system when the housing market collapses, as 
emphasized by Mian and Sufi.38 A bankrupt banking system is not able to 
perform its financial intermediation function. The end result is that the 
crisis in banking spreads to the real economy causing a recession. Then the 
government has to bail out the banking system and the real economy 
through fiscal and monetary policy. Putting the financing of low income 
housing into a GSE would further insulate the private financial system and 
the real economy from the mortgage defaults occurring in low income 
groups. Of course, in practice there would be challenges to implementing 
this scheme. What should be the income requirement for access to this form 
of mortgage finance? Would this represent unfair competition for private 
financial institutions making mortgage loans? Nevertheless, $6–14 trillion 
of lost output triggered by the creation and bursting of the real estate bubble 
is a heavy price to pay for implementing welfare programs through the 
private banking system. 
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IV.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Dodd-Frank that gave birth to the CFPB was the regulatory response to 
the severest financial and economic crisis the country has experienced since 
the Great Depression of the 1930’s. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
part of the Act was intended to prevent the banking system and the shadow 
banking system from implementing a business plan that would compromise 
the financial intermediation function of financial institutions that is so 
necessary for the efficient functioning of the real economy. It was also 
designed to prevent public bailouts of private firms. The CFPB part of the 
Act was designed in part to provide more information to consumers of 
financial products, and in part to make it more difficult for financial 
institutions to supply financial products that turned out–in retrospect–to be 
toxic to some consumers and the financial system. The foundation for both 
policy initiatives was based on an assessment of what it would have taken 
to prevent the Great Crisis from beginning in 2007. Many economists and 
legal scholars think this is like preparing for the next war as if it will be the 
same as the last war. The next financial/economic crisis will probably be 
different. The important question is whether the policy changes 
implemented under Dodd-Frank will be flexible enough to deal with any, 
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